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MASTER'S LIABILITY FOR THE WILFUL ASSAULT
OF HIS SERVANT
The general rule as to a master's liability to third persons *or
the tortious acts of his servants has been stated as follows: "Except
as to fellow servants, a master is subject to liability for injuries
caused by the tortious conduct of his servants within the scope of
their employment."' This rule has been applied without much difficulty in the case of negligent acts of the servant, but when the act
is wilful, a certain difficulty arises in determining whether or not
the act is within the scope of employment. It has been said that
under the earlier common law, the very fact that the act was wilful
prevented it from being within the scope of employment.2 It is
generally recognized now, however, that a wilful act, and more
specifically an assault, of a servant may create a liability on the part
of the master. The primary difficulty today arises in drawing the
dividing line between assaults which are within the scope of
employment and assaults which are not. This difficulty is not present in a few exceptional situations, to be mentioned later in this
paper, in which the master is liable for wilful assaults of the servant
beyond the scope of employment.
There are, of course, cases of express or implied authority to
act with force under certain circumstances, and in such cases the
master is liable where the assault takes place under the prescribed
circumstances.' A typical case is that of a watchman who is authorized to use force in the protection of his employer's property.
Frequently the master is liable even where there is no authority, express or implied, to commit the assault if the act is done in the
furtherance of the master's interest. In one such case, the employee
of a detective agency was sent out to find a criminal, and he attacked the plaintiff in an effort to make him confess the crime.
Here there was apparently no authority for the act, but the detective
agency was held liable because the act was done in the furtherance
of its interest.'
In another case, the defendant's superintendent
struck the planitiff in an effort to make her go back to work for
the defendant, and the defendant was held liable for the superintendent's act.'
'RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1933)
2MECHEM, OUTLINES OF AGENCY

Sec. 219(1).
(3d ed. 1923) pp. 356-357.
'Denver and Rio Grande Ry. v. Harris, 122 U. S. 597 (1887);
Wade v. Thayer, 40 Cal. 578 (1871) (Reversed on another point);
Baker Hotel of Dallas v. Rogers, -

Tex. -,

157 S. W. (2d)

940

(1941).
Mansfield v. Win. J. Burns International Detective Agency, 102
Kan. 687, 171 Pac. 625 (1918).
'Richard v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 79 N. H. 380, 109 Atl. 88 (1920).
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Another factor which may bring the assault within the scope of
employment is authority, express or implied, to use a weapon of
some sort. In such cases the defendant is liable even where the
servant makes imprudent use of the weapon
However, it has been
held that where the use of the weapon was not contemplated at the
time of employment, as where the employee carries a gun for his
own purpose, the use of the gun, even though in the furtherance of
the employer's interest, does not make the master liable.7 This
seems to be inconsistent with the earlier statement that sometimes a
master is liable for unauthorized acts done in the furtherance of
his interest. Perhaps, though, the courts feel that it would work too
great a hardship to make the master liable for unauthorized use of a
dangerous weapon by the servant.
A situation in which the master is held liable although the act
apparently is out of the scope of employment occurs where the
servant's assault grows immediately out of his relation with the
plaintiff which was within the scope of employment. In such cases
the courts do not attempt to draw a line between the acts which
were within the scope of employment and those which were not.
In one such case, New Ellerslie Fishing Club v. Stewar? the defendant's employee, who was authorized to protect the defendant's property from trespassers, started to oust the plaintiff, who was rightfully on the property. A personal dispute between the plaintiff and
the employee followed, and the employee struck the plaintiff. The
defendant employer was held liable. However, in Moore v. Ford
Motor Company," which was decided by the same court as New
Ellerslie Fishing Club v. Stewart, supra, the court did not hold the
employer liable, even though the circumstances were quite similar.
In the Moore case, the defendant's employee tried to make the plaintiff, a former employee of the defendant, fill out a form for the
defendant concerning termination of employment. The plaintiff refused, an argument followed, and the employee struck the plaintiff.
Althought it is probably contra to the way most of the courts would
hold in such a case, the decision in the Moore case seems to be the
proper result. The idea of making the master liable even for the
Conchin v. El Paso and S. W. R. Co., 13 Ariz. 259, 108 Pac. 260
(1910); Robards v. Bannon Sewer Pipe Co., 130 Ky. 380, 113 S. W.
429 (1908); Orr v. William J. Burns International Detective Agency,
337 Pa. 587, 12 A. (2d) 25 (1940); Texas and N. 0. R. Co. v.
Parsons, 102 Tex. 157, 113 S. W. 914 (1908).
'McBee's Adm'x. v. Indian Head Mining Co., 280 Ky. 82, 132
S. W. (2d) 515 (1939); Davis v. Houghtelin, 33 Neb. 582, 50 N. W.
765 (1891).
'Dilli v. Johnson, 107 F. (2d) 669 (1939); New Ellerslie Fishing
Club v. Stewart, 123 Ky.8, 93 S. W. 598 (1906); Murrick v. Durham,
181 N. C. 188, 106 S. E. 665 (1921).
'123 Ky. 8, 93 S. W. 598 (1906), cited supra note 8.
"265 Ky. 575, 97 S. W. (2d) 400 (1936):
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negligence of the servant while acting in the scope of his employment is somewhat questionable; but holding the master liable for a
wilful act of the servant which is done because of a personal dispute
is entirely unjustifiable.
The liability of the master in all of the above cases has been
based on the rule of respondeat superior, that is, that the master is
liable because the act occurred within the scope of the servant's
employment. There are at least four, and perhaps five, situations
where the master is held liable for the assault of the servant outside
of the scope of employment. The first of these exceptions occurs
where the defendant negligently keeps in his employ a person whom
he knows or should know to be incapable or unreliable" In such
cases, the master is not liable because the act of the servant is
imputed to him, but rather he is liable because of his own negligence. In all of the cases cited in support of this rule, it seems
probable that the employer owed a special duty to the injured person. It seems that it would not be fair to hold the master liable for
all acts of a dangerous servant merely because of the master and
servant relation.
A second exception in which the master is liable for the assaults
of the servant beyond the scope of employment is that of the carrier
for hire.'
This liability is based on the common law duty of the
carrier to the passenger which makes the carrier an insurer of the
passenger's safety. In all such cases, the carrier and passenger relation must exist to create this high degree of liability." According to
one Kentucky case,' this relation continued to exist so as to impose the high degree of duty on the carrier where the carrer's employee assaulted a passenger alighting from a bus in the carrier's
terminal and then immediately followed it up with a battery on the
passenger on the street.
Another exception, somewhat similar to the carrier exception, is
that of the innkeeper. This exception, like that of the carrier, is
based on the theory that the innkeeper is an insurer of his patrons'
safety. Some earlier cases did not recognize this high degree of
liability in the case of an innkeeper, and said the innkeeper was
liable only for acts of the servant within the scope of his employ' Henderson v. Nalting First Mortgage Corporation, 184 Ga. 724,
193 S. E. 347 (1937); Hall v. Smathers, 240 N. Y. 486, 148 N. E. 654
(1925); Swinarton v. Le Boutillier, 28 N. Y. S. 53, 7 Misc. 639 (1894).
'Birmingham Ry. and Electric Co. v. Baird, 130 Ala. 334, 30 So.
456 (1900); Southeastern Greyhound Corp. v. Graham, 69 Ga. App.
621, 26 S. E. (2d) 371 (1943); Co-op Cab Co. v. Singleton, 66 Ga.
App. 874, 19 S. E. (2d) 541 (1942); Shankle v. Tri-State Transit Co.,
-La. App.-, 8 So. (2d)) 714 (1942).
'" Horecher v. Pere Marquette Ry. Co., 238 Ill. App. 278 (1925);
Manatis v. Cumberland and M. Ry. Co., 222 Ky. 190, 300 S. W. 593
(1927).
' Gladdish v. Southeastern Greyhound Lines, 293 Ky. 498, 169
S. W. (2d) 297 (1943).
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ment.? However, the later cases seem to recognize the innkeeper's
position as an insurer of his guests' safety.'
A possible fourth exception which would make the master liable
as an insurer is that of the person who for business purposes holds
out to prospective customers that his premises are safe." However,
the weight of authority does not seem to recognize such an exception, and holds that such a person is only liable for acts of his
servants which are within the scope of the employment."
The final exception which makes the master liable beyond the
scope of employment occurs where the master intrusts to the servant
a dangerous instrumentality and the servant uses it for his own purposes. " These cases are largely confined to railroad companies because of the narrow position which the courts take in determining
what things are and what things are not dangerous instumentalities.
Poisons, explosives, spring-guns, railway locomotives, railway torpedoes, and motor driven railway "tricycles" have been treated as
dangerous instrumentalities within the meaning of this rule.
However, such commonplace things as automobiles, railway handcars, or horse drawn cars are not treated as dangerous instrumentalities so as to impose absolute liability on the employer."
SELBY HURST

'Rahmel v. Lehndorff, 142 Cal. 681, 76 Pac. 659 (1904); Curtis
v. Dinneen, 4 Dak. 245, 30 N. W. 148 (1886).
"'Lehnen v. Hines, 88 Kan. 58, 127 Pac. 612 (1912); Hooper v
Caldarera, -

La. App. -,

164 So. 441 (1935); Clancy v. Barber,

71 Neb. 83, 98 N. W. 440 (1904).
"Stone v. William M. Eisen Co., 219 N. Y. 205, 114 N. E. 44
(1916).
' Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Lantrip, 26 Ala. App. 79,
153 So. 290 (1934); Fairbanks v. Boston Storage Warehouse Co., 139
Mass. 419, 75 N. E. 737 (1905); Smothers v. Welch and Co. Home
Furnishing Co., 310 Mo. 144, 274 S. W. 678 (1925).
"Stewart v. Cary Lumber Co., 146 N. C. 47, 59 S. E. 545 (1907);
Pittsburgh, C. and St. L. Ry. Co. v. Shields, 47 Ohio 387, 24 N. E. 658
(1890); Euting v. Chicago and N. W. Ry. Co., 116 Wis. 13, 92 N. W.
358 (1902).
"' MECHEM, OUTLINES OF AGENCY (3d ed. 1923) pp. 361-362.

